Law and Rights
Supreme Court - R v Armel Gnango - murder
In 2008, Armel Gnango was convicted at the Old Bailey of the murder of Magda Priewska. There was a "shoot out" between Gnango and another man ("Bandana Man"). Magda came innocently upon this event and was killed by a shot to her head. It was established that Bandana Man fired the fatal shot. He was not arrested. At the trial, the judge (Cooke J) directed the jury on the basis of joint enterprise and Gnango was convicted of murder. The murder conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal - judgment July 2010. The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court which has, by a 6 to 1 majority, restored the conviction for murder but has done so on a different legal basis - see R v Armel Gnango [2011] UKSC 59.
Bandana Man would have been guilty of Magda's murder on the basis of transferred malice. The Supreme Court held that Gnango had aided and abetted Bandana Man's attempt to kill him and, although the bullet meant for him killed Magda, he shared the transferred malice liability of Bandana Man.
The various judgments are very much based on policy considerations. As Lord Brown put it (at paras. 68 and 69): - " ... to my mind the all important
consideration here is that both A and B were intentionally engaged in a potentially lethal unlawful gunfight (a ?shoot-out? as it has also been described) in the course of which an innocent passerby was killed. The general public would in my opinion be astonished and appalled if in those circumstances the law attached liability for the death only to the gunman who actually fired the fatal shot (which, indeed, it would not always be possible to determine). Is he alone to be regarded as guilty of the victim?s murder? Is the other gunman really to be regarded as blameless and exonerated from all criminal liability for that killing? Does the decision of the Court of Appeal here, allowing A?s appeal against his conviction for murder, really represent the law of the land? To my mind the answer to these questions is a plain ?no?
The case is also interesting for the point that the jury had been directed on a legal basis (joint enterprise). The applicability of this was rejected both in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. ( "Common purpose" could hardly exist between two individuals who actually had very different purposes!) It seems that whatever view the jury may have taken of the facts, the Supreme Court considered that the outcome would have been the same had the jury been directed about the law as laid down in the Supreme Court.
-
Jogee And Ruddock ~ Cases At The Uksc And Jcpc
Over 3 days in late October 2015 the Supreme Court of the UK (UKSC) heard the very important criminal law case of Jogee. At the same time, the same judges heard the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) case from Jamaica - Ruddock. ...
-
Catching Up ..... !
Supreme Court UK LIbraryA little bit of catching up ........ a) From 27th to 29th October, the Supreme Court heard the joint enterprise case of R v Jogee. The proceedings may be viewed via the Supreme Court website. Previous post. ...
-
R V Frances Inglis: Considerations Far Removed From Ordinary Murder
The case of Frances Inglis is one which contains, in the words of the Lord Chief Justice, "powerful considerations far removed from the ordinary case of murder." In January 2010, Frances Inglis was convicted at the Old Bailey of the murder (in 2008) of...
-
Joint Enterprise
No apology is made for returning to the vexed topic of joint enterprise in criminal law. In November 2009 the BBC published an article following a Panorama programme about this subject. Now Diane Abbott MP has raised the subject - see The...
-
Joint Enterprise Murder
In R v Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, Lord Brown began his speech by stating ? ?There are many more murderers under our law than there are people who have killed intentionally. The actus reus of murder is, of course, the killing of the victim; the mens rea (established...
Law and Rights